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Trade Liberalisation as an Instrument  





South Asia is home to nearly 1.4 billion people, a vast part of humanity. The 
countries in the region vary widely in the size of the population as well as area and 
physiography. On one side of the scale is India with a population of more than a 
billion while on the other side is Maldives with a population no more than half a 
million. There is Bangladesh which is essentially a flat delta, island countries such as 
Sri Lanka and Maldives and countries full of high rise mountains such as Nepal and 
Bhutan. In between are India and Pakistan with some of everything. While there are 
several such external differences among the countries in the region and their people, 
these are literally only skin-deep. The people in the region share, by and large, the 
same basic culture. In many cases the same or a similar language is spoken across 
the borders. There are, of course, local variations in the general pattern. But that 
diversity makes it all the more interesting and attractive. It is only natural that the 
countries of the region will band together to show a united face to the world. This is 
yet to happen, though.  
The legacy of colonial rules and history and politics since the departure of the 
British, have created a kind of gulf among the South Asian nations. To be sure there 
are certain beneficiaries of the present tension in each country who would want the 
state of mistrust to continue to profit from it. However, the interest of the vast 
citizenry in all these countries is little served by this atmosphere of conflict, explicit 
or hidden. And they, by and large, want this state of tension to be replaced by one of 
harmony. This is the reason why the leaders of the countries in the region have 
finally agreed and established the SAARC, the regional political framework, to work 
towards the creation of a harmonious relationship through regional cooperation.  
There are various spheres of activity for fostering regional cooperation. 
SAARC has been working, with different degrees of success, in some of them. The 
degree of success depends among others on the interest of the countries involved as 
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well as their institutional and resource capabilities to manage the issues in a 
coordinated manner. On the other hand, whether or not a country is interested to 
resolve an issue in association with others depends on their perceived benefit from 
such collaboration. One area where success so far had been limited is economic 
integration through trade liberalisation.  
There had been attempts to first create a preferential trading arrangement and 
later to create SAFTA, South Asian Free Trade Area. The latter was expected to 
come into effect in 2002. But the “entrepreneurs” in the region are apparently so 
scared of competition from each other that they are more interested in perfecting or 
lengthening their negative (euphemistically called the “sensitive”) lists when the 
negotiations take place. The recent meetings of the officials of the SAARC countries 
and the members of their chambers had been no exception. The original launching 
date has been missed since long and the count down to a revised launching date of 
SAFTA in 2006 has begun. But there will be more meetings between now and then 
to smoothen the wrinkles (such as the rules of origin and of course the “sensitive” 
lists) that still exist. We, the ordinary citizens, keep our fingers crossed and can only 
wait for a positive outcome. 
Of course, not all the arguments raised about this or that proposal by this or 
that country against or for its inclusion in the SAFTA statutes are without valid 
reasons. Many of you know about this very well and I do not wish to repeat those 
here. What I would like more to point out is the several directions regarding trading 
arrangements that the South Asian countries are being pulled to at the same time 
creating a situation of confusion in finding the optimal mix of policy actions for most, 
if not all, of them. This I shall discuss in a short while.  
There is another issue which so far, according to my limited knowledge, has 
received apparently little attention either at the academic or policy circles, at least in 
my country. There is little understanding about how domestic policies may interact 
with the efforts at trade liberalisation and regional cooperation to strengthen their 
perceived positive impacts. I would argue that it is the optimal mix of domestic and 
external policies such as trade liberalisation which can provide the greatest benefits 
to the countries in the region. Each one standing alone can only result in limited 
positive impact.  
Returning now to the issues related to trade liberalisation, we first observe that 
globally there is the WTO framework, its rules and procedures which are still 
evolving and some times have become a bone of contention between various groups 
of countries. South Asian nations are not immune from them. While SAARC 
predated WTO, its trade-related initiatives such as SAFTA are now circumscribed by 
the wider WTO rules. How do these compare with each other in their potential 
impact on the countries concerned? 
There are now also the bilateral free trade agreements between some of the 
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regional trade arrangements (apart from that under SAARC). In addition, some of 
them are also members of powerful lobbies (such as G 20) created to influence 
and/or amend WTO rules. Such a situation resembles a spaghetti-bowl of tangled 
interests.
1 How do these fit in with either the South Asia’s own regional framework 
of trade initiatives, or the WTO? 
In South Asia, there is an added complexity. Three of the SAARC countries 
are LDCs. Within the SAFTA agreements that have been worked out so far, these 
countries are expected to have a much longer time frame to liberalise their trade 
within the region. Also, under WTO rules, they are exempt from many of its 
strictures. How are their (LDCs) interests to be protected when some other countries 
within the region become members of groups (such as India and Pakistan in G 20) 
whose demands, if met, may not be entirely in the interests of the LDCs in the region? 
And we now also hear of India offering preferential access to products from LDCs in 
general. Untangling the web of interests and their net impact on any one of the 
economies in the region becomes a policy-maker’s as well as a trade analyst’s 
nightmare. But unless this is done, we may not know where a country’s best interests 
lie, now or in the medium to long run. At the minimum what needs to be done is to 
find a common denominator/premise from among all these complex agreements and 
talks towards agreements to make life somewhat simpler.  
The differences in perceived impact on the South Asian countries of the 
regional cooperation in trade emanate among others from the fact that the levels of 
development in the SAARC nations are not similar, nor are they growing at the same 
rate. India’s GDP, for example, had grown at just about 6 percent per year over the 
decade of the nineties while that of Pakistan had grown at a far slower rate of 3.7 
percent. Bangladesh GDP over the same period has grown at rates of around 5 
percent. In more recent years, the smaller economies of Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan 
have grown at rates above 6 percent. Furthermore, their economic policies over time 
have been quite different making the benchmark situations from which they are 
beginning the attempted cooperation are also substantially at variance with each 
other. Such differences in the initial conditions may mean that the impact of regional 
cooperation, even when positive for every nation, are not going to be shared equally 
by all. 
Allow me to elaborate a little on this last issue. I will focus here more on 
agriculture as this has become the most contentious issue in the WTO deliberations 
including issues related to agricultural trade liberalisation as well as support to 
agriculture which are also partly responsible for the emergence of groups such as G 
20. In doing this, I shall confine myself mostly to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. In 
Bangladesh the reform measures encouraged by the Breton Woods Institutions 
started in the mid-1980s in agriculture. Subsidies on agricultural inputs were more or 
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less completely withdrawn over years, privatisation of inputs supply was introduced 
and in general prices were deregulated. Furthermore, many of the restrictions related 
to import and purchase of irrigation equipments were withdrawn. By the beginning 
of the 1990s, this process of withdrawal of support from agricultural was by and 
large completed. Such a withdrawal of support to agriculture has not, to my 
understanding, happened in any large measure in India till now. In Pakistan, too the 
process has been much slower. It must be noted here that under the present WTO 
rules Bangladesh is under no obligation, as an LDC, to withdraw input price support 
from agriculture. Yet, even the allowable support under the so-called Green Box was 
rather insignificant in recent years, 1-2 percent of the value of agricultural output.  
Of late, however, some of these supports that fall under the WTO’s Amber Box (i.e., 
restricted under its rules) such as subsidy for fertiliser and cheaper fuel for irrigation 
pumps have been reintroduced in a small way.  
Similarly, Bangladesh has initiated large scale reforms to liberalise trade. She 
slashed her tariffs drastically during early 1990s. Since then the pace has slackened but 
still the trend remained downwards. For example, over 1991-92–1995-96, the 
unweighted average customs duty adjusted for tariff exemption and concessions fell 
from 57.5 percent to 22.6 percent. By 2004-05, the rate further fell to 13.5 percent. 
When the degree of openness is considered, both Bangladesh and India have become 
more open by the turn of the century while Pakistan appeared to have faltered. By and 
large, the countries in the subcontinent mainland have still quite some way to go to 
make the whole system transparent and as little distortive as possible.  
Now let us take a look again at agriculture. In all the countries the share of 
agriculture has fallen substantially. Yet, even now more than one-half of the labour 
force is employed in agriculture. The highest is for Nepal at nearly 97 percent 
followed by India at 61 percent. The lowest share is for Sri Lanka which is 40 
percent. It is thus very likely that agriculture will remain the source of livelihood for 
the largest single group of people in these countries for many years to come. With 
the livelihood of so many millions at stake, policy-makers have to be pro-active 
when it concerns agriculture. 
There are two types of issues related to agriculture. How agriculture may 
grow will determine to a considerable extent the future food security in the 
developing countries and certainly in much of South Asia.
2 Ensuring victory in the 
war against hunger will necessitate continued technological progress in agricultural 
production. The mid-sixties saw the beginning of such a war but its outcome so far 
remains inconclusive as millions upon millions of people still go to sleep every night 
with empty stomachs in South Asia.  
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The second issue relates to the impact of trade liberalisation on livelihood of 
peasants. While trade liberalisation may cheapen the cost of food to consumers 
through imports, it may also lead to loss of livelihood and consequent misery to 
millions of marginal and small peasant households. The imports also have to be paid 
for in foreign exchange. A better strategy would therefore be to support agriculture 
as much as possible or allowable and thus minimise the costs of adjustment. What 
support to provide domestically to agriculture to help it grow and withstand the 
pressure of competition from others within the region and outside thus has a bearing 
upon the outcome of attempts at trade liberalisation. The issue of domestic support to 
agriculture assumes particular importance because of the heavy protection given to 
agriculture in one way or other by the OECD countries which never tire in preaching 
the virtues of free market to others. The playing field consequently is globally quite 
uneven.  
The total support provided to agriculture in the OECD countries in 2001 was a 
whooping US$ 311 billion. Support provided to producers was US$ 231 billion. In 
2000, it was somewhat higher at US$ 241 billion. Of this, Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS) was 63 percent. EU tops the list in providing the farm support. Of 
the total producers support, EU provided 40 percent of the total. The respective 
shares of USA, Japan and Korea had been 21, 20 and 7 percent.  
The support to farmers in these countries is such that in Switzerland, Norway, 
Korea and Japan for every one hundred dollars of farm earning, 60-70 dollars is a 
hand out from the government. In EU, it is 35 dollars while in the USA and Canada 
these are lower at around 20 dollars. In some countries such as Norway, Japan and 
South Korea the level of support provided to agriculture more or less matched its 
(agriculture) contribution to GDP in those countries. 
Naturally in such a situation, the farmers in developing countries including 
those in South Asia expect tremendous unfair competition from OECD agricultural 
producers in selling their goods in the export market as well as in the domestic 
market. No wonder that much of the present global debates related to trade, and even 
violent street demonstrations have taken place over the issue of dismantling the 
support structure to agriculture in the OECD countries. 
Question now is what happens when trade is liberalised under such a 
condition? Does it result in net additional welfare for the people?   
To answer some of these questions certain general equilibrium modeling 
exercises have been carried out in our Institute. While models do only imperfectly 
capture the reality, they have the advantage of highlighting its (reality) essential 
features. Then again a general equilibrium model can indicate factors that can 
compound or negate the initial effects of a policy measure. The exercises were, of 
course, done to find out the impacts of policy shifts mainly in Bangladesh, not 
elsewhere within the region. But for some of the exercises, the results are also shown 
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The very first exercise was what happens if the trade all over the world is 
carried out at zero tariff and all non-tariff barriers are absent. This, of course, 
according to neoclassical theory, would be the most welfare-raising situation. And 
indeed it is so. The net additional welfare of Bangladesh over the present situation is 
estimated at US$ 2 billion. SAFTA alone with complete removal of trade restrictions 
is not much helpful as the change in welfare (US$ 111 mn) is only 5 percent of that 
under completely free global trade. But if SAFTA is combined with a uniform tariff 
(of 15 percent) against the rest of the world i.e., a kind of South Asian customs union 
is formed, this results in substantial positive welfare change (US$ 953 mn). This is 
still only one-half as much as that under global free trade, though. However, if 
Bangladesh and India forms a bilateral free trade area, the gains in welfare (US$ 120 
mn) is somewhat more than that under normal SAFTA (i.e.; without the customs 
union).  
These results assume that SAFTA ultimately leads to complete free trade 
within the region. This is not going to happen even if SAFTA is launched next year. 
That means that its impact will be much less than what the model results indicate. 
Consider now what would happen if Bangladesh provides fertiliser subsidy to 
the tune of 1 percent of the value of her agricultural output. This results in a boost to 
agricultural exports and fall in agricultural imports, and rises in output and 
employment. For SAFTA (without customs union arrangements) the welfare change 
is doubled to almost US$ 257 mn. Even for the globally free trade, provision of 
subsidy results in an additional US$ 100 mn gain. Again for bilateral trade with India, 
the welfare changes are doubled. So are for employment changes. In case of GDP 
change, the effect is much stronger, almost 3 times. 
Since Cancun, the Group of 20 which includes India and Pakistan from the 
region has been pressing for withdrawal of agricultural subsidy by the OECD 
countries for creating a level playing field. This apparently does not take into 
account the possibility of harm to countries which may have to import food or 
essential agricultural commodities from some of these OECD countries. Indeed, one 
of the simulations in the model which assumed 50 percent reduction in subsidy in the 
Quad (EU, USA, Canada and Japan) results in a net welfare loss for all countries in 
South Asia, a substantial part of which was due to terms of trade effect.  
The loss to Bangladesh accrues mainly due to liberalisation by EU. Of the 
total loss 70 percent is due to EU liberalisation. The breakdown of the welfare loss 
into its components shows where it bites. One half of the loss is due to lower 
employment of unskilled labour while about a third is attributed to terms of trade 
effect that is higher import prices compared to export prices of farm products. And 
here, if Bangladesh provides a little subsidy, as explained above, it can do wonders. 
In this case where Bangladesh provides a little subsidy, farmers get a boost from two 
sides. The prices rise for their products due to a withdrawal of support in the Quad 
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over-all results are thus all positive and the country takes part more vigorously in 
trade.  
Consider now another experiment. What would happen if technological 
change takes place in Bangladesh agriculture? If factor-neutral technological change 
takes place, up to 10 percent in 10 years time, the gains to the country becomes twice 
as much as that under globally free trade. If the technological change is 20 percent 
over 10 years which is quite plausible given the country’s historical experiences, the 
net welfare gain is US$ 9.3 bn or almost 4 times that under globally free trade. Note 
that we have assumed here the present pattern of trade. If there is freer trade, the net 
positive effect is likely to be further enhanced.  
Where do all these simulation results leave us? Given the caveat against 
model-building, and that the assumptions may not always hold, these results tell us a 
very clear story. Free trade, regional cooperation, trade facilitation measures are all 
good and beneficial. Trade liberalisation and regional cooperation alone, however, 
will not be able to ensure income, food security and quality livelihood to the millions 
of deprived human beings in South Asia. The efficacy of these measures are, 
however, enhanced substantially, some time dramatically, by the adoption of suitable 
domestic policies and their implementation such as providing support to agriculture 
where these are needed in a judicious manner as well as appropriate technology 
policy. Indeed, without the bedrock of sound domestic policies, the edifice of 
regional cooperation through freer trade will bring only limited benefit to the people 
in South Asia. Regional cooperation therefore will also mean harmonisation of these 
national domestic policies so that these do not conflict with each other and negate 
their positive effects. I wonder whether South Asia is ready for such a change! 